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This paper examines premises and data underlying the assertion that some financial institutions in the U.S. 
economy were "too big to fail" and hence warranted government bailout. It traces the merger histories 
enhancing the dominance of six leading firms in the U. S. banking industry and he sharp increases in the 
concentration of financial institution assets accompanying that merger wave. Financial institution profits 
are found to have soared in tandem with rising concentration. The paper advances hypotheses why these 
phenomena might be related and surveys relevant empirical literature on the relationships between market 
concentration, interest rates received and charged by banks, and economies of scale in banking.  
JEL categories G2, L8. 
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1. Introduction 
The bailouts rescuing failing financial institutions that both the U.S. government 
and European governments have found themselves compelled to sustain during the 
recent economic crisis have repeatedly raised the question, "How big is too big?" in 
bank size. For me, as a more or less traditional industrial organization economist, this 
poses a particular challenge. From early in my career, I had drummed into my head the 
mantra of MIT's Morris Adelman, "Absolute size is absolutely irrelevant."
3 And what we 
appear to be addressing is in fact absolute financial institution size. 
What  Adelman  was  saying  is  that  the  core  understanding  of  industrial 
organization  economists,  built  up  over  decades  of  research,  was  that  monopolistic 
influences on price-setting depended upon relative size -- i.e., the size of the price setters 
relative to the market in which they operated. Pure monopoly is of course the extreme 
case: the monopolist commands close to 100 percent of the relevant market. Oligopoly 
is the case that has proved both most interesting in the real world and most difficult. 
The individual sellers are large relative to the market, and a few of them have sufficiently 
large market share, so that they are acutely aware of their interdependence in pricing. 
Given this size relationship, as economists from Augustin Cournot (1838) to Edward 
Chamberlin  (1933)  insisted,  individual  firm  sizes  sufficient  to  give  the  oligopolistic 
sellers a large share of the markets they serve were likely to facilitate prices elevated 
about  the  competitive  level,  inefficient  resource  allocation,  and  maldistribution  of 
income. But this is not my initial 'too big' focus. I shall return later to argue that it may 
be more relevant than we might casually assume. 
Although Morry Adelman rarely missed the mark, in this case, I believe, absolute 
size does have relevance. There are at least three reasons why this may be true. 
                                                 
1 Harvard University 
2 This paper was originally written for a conference at the Fordham University Law School March 12, 
2010. 
3 Adelman (1964). See also Stigler (1956, p. 37).  
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First, as every newspaper reader recognizes, financial institutions may be so large 
relative to the whole world of finance, regardless of their size in individual price-setting 
contexts, and also so interdependent in their relationships, that failure of one or more 
institutions  has  systemic  consequences.  That  is,  one  large  institution's  failure,  and  its 
attendant  inability  to  meet  obligations  to  a  host  of  financial  counter-parties,  can 
jeopardize the health of numerous other banks. And if many banks' credit "freezes up" 
as  a  result  of  these  failures,  the  prosperity  of  the  economy  as  a  whole  can  be 
jeopardized. This is a real and serious problem, one known to economists since at least 
the time of Adam Smith. 
Second,  absolute  size  may  carry  not  only  this  hazard,  but  it  may  also  yield 
economies of scale and scope that make individual banks better able to perform their 
vital functions, providing credit to economic actors on more favorable terms. Whether 
this is true is an empirical question. I shall return to it, constrained to be sure by severe 
limits on economists' knowledge of such matters. 
Third, financial institutions that are large in absolute size may have deep and well-
filled pockets with which they can among other things hire lobbyists, support individual 
political  parties  and  election  candidates,  and,  under  the  recent  Supreme  Court 
reinterpretation  of  the  U.S.  Constitution's  first  amendment,  mount  advertising 
campaigns in direct support of or opposition to election candidates.
4 In Federalist Paper 
No. 10, James Madison warned against the political power of factions resulting from 
"the verious and unequal distribution of property" ... " who are united and actuated by 
some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, 
or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." Robert Bork (1966; 
1978, Chapter 2) has argued that concern over the resource misallocation that comes 
from monopoly power in specific markets -- i.e., relative size -- was what primarily 
motivated the U.S. Congress to enact the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890. Critics such as 
Robert Lande and I have argued that Bork's interpretation is erroneous.
5 I leave for 
another forum the more detailed exploration of this debate. 
Here I offer only one additional strand of historical evidence -- Figure 1, drawn by 
artist Joseph Keppler for Puck magazine, January 23, 1889 -- a year before the Sherman 
Act  was  passed.  One  cannot  view  it  without  recognizing  that  the  U.S.  public  was 
alarmed at the time about the political power of the great trusts, for which we might 
now substitute bloated figures for JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and Goldman 
Sachs. It would be hard to deny that public concerns over the trusts' power in federal 
and state legislatures were an important stimulus to the Sherman Act's passage.
6 And 
now, 120 years later, there is abundant reason to fear the enormous political power of 
the financial institutions, said by Drum (2010) to own Washington "lock, stock, and 
barrel." In 2008, for example, the finance lobby is said to have contributed $475 million 
to political candidates and their supporting party organizations -- more than twice the 
                                                 
4 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 Supreme Court Reports 876 (January 2010). 
5 My principal venture into the debate was Scherer (1990a).  
6 See also Thorelli (1954), especially Chapters 2, 3, and 6. 
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level of contributions from the second-largest lobby, the health care industry.
7 To be 
sure, an industry of relatively small entities such as farmers ($65 million in 2008) might 
amass  large  political  contributions  through  the  efforts  of  industry-spanning  trade 
associations. But what evidence we have suggests that collective action groups such as 
the  American  Bankers  Association  were  relatively  minor  factors  in  the  torrent  of 
political donations.
8  
2. The Stylized Facts 
Let  me  proceed  by  laying  out what  economists  call  "stylized  facts"  --  that  is, 
parcels of evidence without direct theoretical or proven causal connections to the issues 
of bank size. I then proceed to examine what we actually know about causal links. 
The first salient fact is that the banking industry has experienced during the past 
three decades a merger wave of monumental proportions. Dean Amel of the Federal 
Reserve Board staff reports (2002) that between 1990 and 2001 -- i.e., before the mega-
mergers precipitated by the 2008 financial crisis -- U.S. banks consummated mergers 
and acquisitions valued at more than $900 billion.
9 My own attempt to determine what 
happened is best reported in two steps.  
First, from Fortune magazine's annual lists of the 100 largest commercial banking 
and  diversified  financial  companies,  I  began  with  the  listing  published  (from  1984 
financial reports) of the largest corporations as of 1985 and traced what happened to 
them by the close of 2008. Among the 30 leaders ranked by assets as of 1985, only nine 
survived in more or less recognizable form at the end of 2008. Eighteen of the 30 
disappeared through mergers; three failed and were liquidated by governmental financial 
guarantors.  
The second step is embodied in Figure 2. It traces principal events in the merger 
histories of six corporations that by the end of 2008 had become the largest U.S.-based 
financial entities measured by asset volume.
10 Altogether, 53 substantial components are 
found  to  come  together  into  six  surviving  entities,  ranked  in  order  of  end-of-2008 
assets. The 1985 asset ranks of the merging entities are given in parentheses following 
the company names. Not all of the named survivors were the first movers in mergers 
that led to substantial consolidation. In four cases marked [circle L], another bank took 
the lead, choosing after consummating a merger to adopt a new name based upon the 
name of its acquisition target. The analysis was able to track only the most significant 
mergers. At the end of each surviving company trajectory is a number followed by 
"SM," for small mergers. That number was obtained by tracking smaller acquisitions 
reported in the company histories published in Moody's (now Mergent's) Bank & Finance 
Manual.  It  is  probably  incomplete,  but  altogether,  139  acquisitions  too  small  to  be 
                                                 
7 Drum (2010) at p. 42. 
8 Data on contributions are lacking, but in 2008, ABA's lobbying outlays in Washington were 2.0 percent 
of total finance industry lobbying expenditures. 
9 An even higher figure of $3.6 trillion for the years 1990-2005 is suggested by Steven Piloff (2009), pp. 
269-270. 
10 For a similar but somewhat more limited analysis of the top four banks as of 2008, prepared by an artist 
much more skilled than I, see Drum (2010) at p. 43.  
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accommodated  in  Figure  2  were  tabulated.
11  Clearly,  the  industry's  merger-based 
structural transformation has been profound. 
A related stylized fact has been the increasing concentration of total U.S. financial 
assets held by the largest institutions. It is shown by Figure 3, drawn without change 
from  page  100  of  an  excellent  book  by  Henry  Kaufman  (2009),  former  managing 
director of Salomon Brothers. Until the end of the 1980s decade, there was a gradual 
decrease in the concentration of financial institution asset holdings. After that, a striking 
upsurge occurred. In 1990, the largest ten financial companies controlled a bit less than 
10 percent of total U.S. financial institution assets; by 2004, when Kaufman's series 
ends, their share exceeded 50 percent. The top 20 institutions controlled 14 percent of 
assets in 1990, rising to 63 percent in 2004.
12 After 2004 the concentration process 
undoubtedly continued as the largest institutions absorbed huge financial intermediaries 
brought into jeopardy by the crisis of 2008. 
The third key stylized fact is presented in Figure 4.
13 It shows for 1960 through 
the  third  quarter  of  2008  profits  (before  income  taxes)  reported  by  U.S.  financial 
corporations  as  a  percentage  of  total  domestic  industries'  corporate  profits.  The 
financial sector's share fluctuated in the range of 8 to 18 percent up to the late 1980s, 
after which a sharp increase is evident. A decline from the peak of 41.4 percent occurred 
after 2002, presumably as an advance indicator of the crisis that reached a crescendo in 
2008. The profit figures are if anything understated because of the bonuses paid by 
leading  financial  houses  to  their  employees,  and  especially  their  top  managers  and 
traders, which came at the expense of what would otherwise be higher reported profits. 
It is hard to make an appropriate adjustment. A frequently violated rule of thumb on 
Wall Street was that 50 percent of pre-tax, pre-bonus profits were paid out as bonuses. 
Applying the rule literally would raise the trend line in Figure 4 to roughly 1.2 times the 
values shown. But the rule presumably did not pervade the entire financial industry -- 
the focus of Figure 4. Bonuses were undoubtedly lower for thousands of local and 
regional banks, many insurance companies, and the like. What can be said is that the 
bonus  effect  cannot  have  been  insubstantial.  In  2009,  for  example,  the  total 
compensation of employees at the five largest Wall Street banks alone was $114 billion, 
or 28 percent of the total profits tabulated in Figure 4 for pre-crisis year 2007.
14 End-of-
year bonuses alone of banks located in New York City totalled $25.6 billion in peak year 
                                                 
11 For another wider-sweeping merger history used as an additional resource underlying Figure 2, see the 
entry, "List of Bank Mergers in the United States," Wikipedia, February 1, 2010.  
12 At p. 99 Kaufman reports the terminal top 20 share at 70 percent. 
13 It is drawn from the Economic Report of the President (United States, January 2009), Table B-91. An 
earlier version reports that the financial sector includes depository institutions, nondepository credit 
institutions,  securities  and  commodity  brokers,  insurance  companies,  investment  companies,  small 
business investment companies, and real estate investment trusts. Data included in the original source 
on Federal Reserve bank profits have been excluded from Figure 4. The 2010 Report data are not fully 
compatible with those in Figure 4. 
14 "Once Banks Hand Out Pay, A Pittance for Shareholders," New York Times, Jan. 27, 2010, Business 
Section pp. 1 and 8. See also "As Goldman Thrives, Some Say an Ethos Faded," New York Times, Dec. 
16, 2009, pp. A1 and A28; "Top Pay List for Bankers: Fresh Names," New York Times, February 11, 
2010, pp. A1 and B6; and (on hedge fund managers) "Just a Little Off the Top," New York Times, 
March 24, 2009, Business Section pp. 1 and 4. F. M. Scherer, A perplexed economist confronts 'too big to fail' 
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2005, or six percent of total financial institution profits in that year.
15 And there is 
evidence that the compensation paid to financial industry employees generally -- not just 
their top executives -- contains substantial "rents" above and beyond what would have 
been required to call forth the services of equally intelligent, well-trained individuals. A 
study  by  Goldin  and  Katz  (2008)  of  pay  received  by  three  generational  cohorts  of 
Harvard College graduates showed that, after controlling for SAT scores, undergraduate 
grade  point  averages,  types  of  graduate  school  degrees,  gender, and  other variables, 
those who worked for the financial industries received on average compensation 195 
percent higher than their peers. 
3. A Logical Leap 
One trained as I was in the structure - conduct - performance paradigm of the 
industrial  organization  specialty  might  view  these  stylized  facts  and  reason,  "Aha! 
Concentration of activity in the financial industries has been rising sharply. And so also 
has profitability. As in a host of prior structure - profit analyses, it would appear that 
higher concentration has led to higher profits." Indeed, the simple correlation between 
contiguous  portions  of  the  concentration  series  in Figure  3  and  the  profit  series  in 
Figure 4 is +0.71, with a t-ratio on the concentration coefficient of 6.57. 
It is also well known that correlation does not prove causation. Here the warnings 
of Morry Adelman and George Stigler return to haunt us. The many published structure 
- profit analyses by industrial organization economists have to my knowledge never 
implied a causal relationship between aggregate concentration -- the phenomenon measured 
by Figure 3 -- and profitability. Rather, the studies show, and relevant theory supports, a 
relationship  between  profits  and  seller  concentration  relative  to  narrowly  defined 
economic  markets.  If  any  sense  is  to  be  made  of  the  observed  coincidence,  tighter 
logical links must be supplied. 
The  major  profit  spinners  on  Wall  Street  have  not  been  the  mundane  retail 
banking activities for which Jimmy Stewart won fame in the motion picture, "It's a 
Wonderful Life," or that my childhood neighbor Ralph Claus practiced as president of 
the First National Bank of Ottawa, Illinois (still operating as an independent entity!). 
Rather,  the  big  profits  are  said  to  come  from  investment  banking  --  e.g.,  the 
management of new securities issues on behalf of corporate clients from every sector of 
the  economy,  the  de  novo  packaging  and  issue  of  new  hybrid  securities  such  as 
collateralized debt obligations or credit default swaps, providing advice to corporations 
on such matters as mergers and acquisitions, and (perhaps predominantly, according to 
recent  analyses  of  Goldman  Sachs  profits)  speculative  trading  in  securities, 
commodities, and foreign exchange on the institution's own account. 
Many of these activities are subsumed under the category, "investment banking," 
as  distinguished  from  more  routine  commercial  banking  operations.  I  learned  as  a 
student of finance at the Harvard Business School, and I have not in the past 50 years 
seen  compelling  contradictory  evidence,  that  investment  banking  is  a  "relationship 
activity." That is, investment banks build up over the years relationships, both personal 
and reputational, with their would-be clients, so that, say, a company seeking to float a 
                                                 
15 "Wall Street '09 Bonuses Increase 17% to $20 Billion," New York Times, Feb. 24, 2010, p. B7.  
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new  securities  issue  or  merge  does  not  choose  from  dozens  of  possible  financial 
intermediaries for support, but from a handful. In more technical terms, investment 
bank services are not the homogeneous commodity of pure economic theory, but a 
differentiated product -- i.e., what Chamberlin emphasized in his path-breaking 1933 book. 
As a Fortune magazine author observed, "If Ford Motor Company wanted to raise $5 
billion in debt from public investors, chances are that it would turn to Goldman Sachs 
to help it raise the money."
16 If there is truth in this conjecture, investment banking is 
not  in  fact  a  homogeneous  blob  in  which  aggregate  concentration  is  behaviorally 
irrelevant,  but  instead  a  set  of  differentiated  sub-markets,  in  many  of  which  the 
participants recognize their oligopolistic interdependence.
17 The operating realm of such 
differentiated industries is called product characteristics space by economists.
18  
Given that investment banking is relational and hence a panoply of possibly tight 
oligopolies in product characteristics space, it may follow that there is also significant 
product differentiation in the speculative trading activities that appear to be a mainstay 
of the major Wall Street institutions' profits. In particular, if Institutions A, B, and C 
have close links with the real-world companies that produce non-financial goods and 
services, they are also likely to have superior information on what the near future is 
likely to hold for those companies. There may also be specialization of focus in financial 
institutions'  knowledge  of  particular  companies  and  commodities.  And  given  this 
superior  information,  the  relevant  institutions  occupy  a  privileged  position  to  trade 
profitably  in  the  securities  issued  or  commodities  processed  by  "stuff"-producing 
companies.  
 If this is true, increases in aggregate concentration matter economically for the 
following  reason. Widespread  mergers  and  rising  aggregate  concentration  mean  that 
many of the institutions occupying differentiated positions in the product characteristics 
space of finance have disappeared into the fold of other institutions, leaving tighter 
oligopolies  in  any  given  segment.  As  Blackstone  Group  CEO  Steve  Schwartzman 
observed, "The changes on Wall Street are immense. There are major players who no 
longer exist, and the remaining players are making more money because there are fewer 
competitors  and  bigger  spreads."
19  And  unless  there  is  easy  entry  into  the  most 
profitable niches in that space -- something that is far from evident -- tighter oligopoly 
leads to greater mutual interdependence in pricing and bid-quoting and hence higher 
profits. Mergers among other things eliminate firms that would otherwise be what Joe S. 
                                                 
16 William D. Cohen, "The Man Who Walked Away from Goldman Sachs," Fortune, February 8, 2010, p. 
108.  Similarly,  a  former  Goldman  Sachs  executive  observed  that  derivative  trading  --  said  to  yield 
"billions in profit" -- is dominated by five banks. "A Goldman Guy Turns on the Street," Bloomberg 
Business Week, Feb. 22, 2010, p. 68. And among the top twelve banks, the four leaders provided 
merger advice in 50 percent of the deals by value acquired. "Mergers and Acquisitions," The Economist, 
January 2, 2010. 
17 An important anomaly that  seems explicable only in  oligopolistic interdependence is that the fees 
charged for new securities offerings in the United States are 7 percent of the issue value, whereas in 
Europe they fall in the 4 percent range. "High-speed Slide," The Economist, Nov. 14, 2009, p. 86. 
18 On the concept of product characteristics space, see Scherer (1980), pp. 393-398; and the references 
(especially Kelvin Lancaster, A. Michael Spence, and Richard Schmalensee) cited there. 
19 "Steve Schwartzman Starts Warming Up," Business Week, Nov. 30, 2009, p. 14. F. M. Scherer, A perplexed economist confronts 'too big to fail' 
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Bain  (1956,  Chapters  1  and  3)  called  the  "most  favored  entrants"  into  relevant 
differentiated market spaces, increasing, perhaps greatly, the length of time between the 
emergence  of  supra-normal  profits,  through  simple  oligopolistic  interdependence  or 
innovation creating new product niches, and the entry of competitors to dissipate those 
profits. The result is increased oligopoly power and the higher profits that accompany it. 
4. Indirect Evidence 
This suggested nexus, I admit, is speculative. I have not worked on Wall Street 
except in isolated consulting assignments and I am not a financial economics specialist. 
Given my limitations, I consulted two fellow economists who have spent their careers 
studying the functioning of financial services markets. What I learned is that we possess 
a  huge  amount  of  systematic  empirical  evidence  on  structure  -  performance 
relationships in the commercial banking sector, but very little evidence on what happens 
in investment banking and related financial specialties. We know a lot about commercial 
banking among other things because the U.S. Federal Reserve Board collects extensive 
quantitative evidence on the structure of local banking markets, the details of banks' 
income statements, the interest rates banks pay to their depositors for various kinds of 
monetary instruments, and the interest rates they charge -- i.e., their prices -- on the 
local loans they make. This information has been analyzed extensively. On the other 
hand, there is an information void on the investment banking sector, in part because no 
federal statistical agency has been a position to perform Justice Brandeis' "sunlight" 
function
20 and perhaps also because the investment banking beast is so complex that its 
contours can be mapped and investigated only with the greatest of difficulty. 
Lacking direct evidence, I turn for indirect enlightenment to the studies that have 
been done on commercial banking. In this effort I have been helped by a member of 
the Federal Reserve Board staff, who provided an extensive list of publications on the 
structure and performance of banking markets.
21 From that list I selected 16 items, later 
augmented, whose titles suggested the highest likelihood of shedding empirical light on 
relevant structure - performance links. The evidence can be divided into three main 
categories -- effects of structure on pricing, economies of scale and scope, and merger 
consequences. 
Market Structure and Pricing 
The  evidence  that  monopolistic  or  tightly  oligopolistic  local  banking  market 
structures lead to lower interest rates for depositors -- by from 25 to 150 basis points -- 
appears to be quite consistent.
22 Hannan's analysis (1992) suggests that the strongest 
structural predictor of lower rates is the market share held by the largest bank in a 
relevant market. For Italy, however, concentration-increasing mergers were found to 
                                                 
20 See Scherer (1990b), pp. 461-487. 
21 My debt to Dean Amel is great, but presumably unrecorded on the Fed's books. I should be happy to 
provide the complete list to those who request it. 
22 See e.g. Berger and Hannan (1989); Prager and Hannan (1998); Piloff (2009) at pp. 284-287.  
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reduce consumer rates by about 13 basis points in the short run but to increase them by 
a similar magnitude several years after the mergers were consummated.
23 
Two studies by Hannan (1991, 1992) also show borrowers paying higher rates in 
more  concentrated  local  banking  markets.  Erel  (2006)  reports  lower  lending  rates 
following sizeable mergers, but when the mergers significantly increased concentration 
in locally defined markets, the opposite was true -- borrowers paid higher rates, all else 
equal.  Peterson  and  Rajan  (1995)  provide  a  more  nuanced  picture.  In  concentrated 
banking markets, they find, young (i.e., newly established) borrowers tend to pay lower 
interest rates for their loans. But they infer that the initial low rates are in effect bargains 
with which banks attract new customers into a relationship, after which they exploit 
their  lock-in  power  to  move  the  borrowers  up  to  loan  terms  yielding  higher-than-
competitive rents. Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) add an additional nuance. Focusing on 
market structure changes rather than interest rates, they find product differentiation and 
hence  market  segmentation  among  the  offerings  of  conventional  banks  and  thrift 
institutions. The effect of more local competition in reducing banks' profits tends to be 
higher when the additional competition involves similar institutions rather than cross-
category banks. Thrifts (i.e., savings and loan banks) tend to be insulated from changes 
in the structure of proximate conventional banking markets, while the elimination of a 
local commercial bank through acquisition by a multimarket commercial bank reduces 
competition and (by inference) raises profitability, especially in the farming communities 
in which local market banks appear to have comparative advantage. 
Economies of Scale and Scope 
It is well established that the existence of scale or scope economies can confound 
analyses of the relationship between market structure and profitability, although studies 
focusing on price effects (like some of those cited above) avoid this complication.
24 
Several studies have shed important light on whether larger bank size yields appreciable 
cost savings or similar advantages. 
The consensus of studies focusing on commercial banks is that there are indeed 
economies  of  scale,  revealed  inter  alia  by  lower  expense  ratios  for  larger  banks. 
However, the cost savings appear to be realized mainly through increases in bank sizes 
up to deposit levels of approximately $500 million -- much less than the scale of, say, 
the largest 100 U.S. financial institutions. Beyond that threshold, cost advantages appear 
to  fade  or  even  reverse,  implying  an  L-shaped  or  U-shaped  long-run  average  cost 
function.
25  Citing  related  research  by  Federal  Reserve  Bank  staff,  Alan  Greenspan 
observed in 2010 that they had been "unable to find economies of scale in banking 
beyond a modest-sized institution."
26 The only known study (Goldberg, 1991) focusing 
                                                 
23 Focarelli and Panetta (2003). 
24 See e.g. Ravenscraft (1983). 
25 See e.g. McAllister and McManus (1993). Piloff (2009, p. 287) suggests that small "benefits of size" 
might persist out to bank sizes of $10 billion to $25 billion. The 19th largest bank in 2008 had assets of 
$25 billion and the 47th largest assets of $10 billion. F. M. Scherer, A perplexed economist confronts 'too big to fail' 
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on  securities  issuance  and  trading  activities  suggests  average  cost  savings  up  to  a 
threshold of roughly $1 billion in assets. 
Two potential exceptions must be recognized. Because they are able to assemble 
larger and potentially more diversified portfolios of loans and other investments, larger 
banks might in principle be less risky and hence attract needed capital at lower costs 
than their smaller compatriots. McAllister and McManus (1993, pp. 398-403) explore 
this possibility with particular care. They found that capital-raising costs decline more 
sharply with size than other costs, but only up to a threshold of roughly $500 million of 
total assets, after which constant returns to scale appear to hold.  
 This result puzzled me, since one might expect portfolio effects to persist, to be 
sure  more  gradually,  at  even  larger  scales.  In  my  own  study  of  multi-plant  scale 
economies  in  twelve  important  manufacturing  industries,  I  found  capital-raising 
economies to persist out to indefinitely large scales, although for most of the industries 
they were only slight or moderate in importance relative to total costs.
27 And indeed, 
persistent capital-raising economies are suggested in a new study by James Kwak (2010). 
Kwak performs a multiple regression analysis on interest expense as a percentage of 
average bank earning assets for a large sample of banks and bank holding companies 
(excluding segregated investing banking operations) for the years 2004 and 2009. He 
found persistent interest cost savings of 16 to 20 basis points (i.e., 0.16 to 0.20 percent) 
for each tenfold increase in total bank assets, ceteris paribus.
28 For 2009 but not 2004 he 
also found a powerful capital cost saving effect for the very largest banks, which he 
attributed to the government's demonstrated willingness to rescue those "too big to fail" 
banks in adversity. It is unclear how much of this effect is attributable to paying lower 
interest on short- and long-term deposits, reflecting possible monopsony power, and 
how much to pure diversification. That the relationship was at least partly associated 
with diversification is indicated by his inclusion of a separate variable measuring deposit 
liabilities as a percentage of total assets. The variable was significantly negative, showing 
the lower rates paid on deposits relative to longer-term debt. 
It  is  also  true  from  recent  history  that  the  largest  institutions  can  allocate 
disastrously large segments of their investment portfolios to flawed prospects, creating 
the well-known "too big to fail" problem. On the whole, therefore, the advantages of 
diversification beyond scales achieved by, say, the largest 50 U.S. financial institutions 
appear to be either unproved or modest. 
                                                                                                                                        
26  Alan  Greenspan,  "The  Crisis,"  paper  presented  at  the  Brookings  Institution  March  19,  2010.  Mr. 
Greenspan goes on to note that staff findings led him a decade earlier to state that "megabanks being 
formed  by  growth  and  consolidation  are  increasingly  complex  entities  that  create  the  potential  for 
unusually large systematic risks." 
27 F. M. Scherer et al. (1975), pp. 284-289 and 394-395. The underlying regression analysis was reported in 
separate volume, Economies of Scale at the Plant and Multi-Plant Levels, deposited at major research 
libraries and the Federal Trade Commission library. 
28  In  my  own  similar  regression  for  typically  smaller  industrial  corporations,  see  note  25  supra,  the 
comparable coefficients implied interest cost savings as a percentage of debt (a narrower measure than 
Kwak's) of 64 to 107 basis points with a tenfold increase in company assets. 
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In  a  particularly  comprehensive  survey  of  the  relevant  literature,  Berger  et  al. 
(1993) identify a second advantage of large bank scale, highlighted in a study of merger 
effects by Fixler and Zieschang (1993).
29 They find that scale-increasing mergers appear 
to have strong positive effects on the output side of the institutions' activities, that is, on 
their revenues, holding cost conditions constant (statistically). It is unclear how this result 
should be interpreted. It could be seen as a consequence of superior monopoly power 
associated with greater size relative to particular markets, as we have seen earlier. Or it 
may mean that larger institutions are better able to enter differentiated but concentrated 
financial  market  segments,  in  which,  again,  revenue  enhancement  relative  to  costs 
follows from monopoly  power. Absent further evidence, I infer that the Fixler and 
Zieschang result is not inconsistent with the interpretation I have drawn earlier. 
Further Merger Effects 
Many studies of merger effects yield evidence on cost efficiency similar to what 
has been reported above.
30 Here some additional findings are summarized.  
From case studies of nine mergers selected because they "seemed relatively likely 
to yield efficiency gains," Rhoades (1998) found that most of the acquiring companies 
did indeed realize cost reductions consistent with their pre-merger projections.
31 Many 
of the gains came from eliminating overlapping office functions. The most common 
reason for failed cost-saving efforts was difficulty integrating electronic data processing 
functions. 
Adams et al. (2009) analyzed the effects of concentration-increasing mergers on 
post-merger market structure. They found that the more concentrated markets were 
post-merger,  and  especially  the  more  mergers  per  se  increased  local  market 
concentration, the more new entry there was subsequently into the relevant markets. 
They interpret this finding as evidence that "market forces might mitigate at least some 
of the anticompetitive effects associated with high concentration."
32 An extension of 
their interpretation might be that increases in concentration led to price increases, which 
in turn attracted new entry, or that service quality deteriorated following merger.
33 This 
                                                 
29 The same April 1993 issue of the Journal of Banking and Finance is devoted entirely to studies of 
financial institution efficiency, with emphasis on scale effects. Many of the Berger et al. observations 
reinforce the inferences I have drawn in this section. 
30 For a summary, see Amel et al. (2002).  
31 One selection criterion was that the merger partners be of relatively equal size pre-merger. Ravenscraft 
and  I  found  (1987,  Chapter  4)  that,  in  contrast  to  more  general  results,  mergers  of  equals  had 
significantly positive profitability effects. 
32 Adams et al. (2009), p. 229. This is consistent with the findings by Dennis Mueller (1985) for non-
financial mergers. 
33 An example from personal experience: In one of the many mergers that led my 1990s banker, the 
Harvard Trust Company, into the arms of the Bank of America, the acquiring bank (probably Bank 
Boston; see Figure 2) changed its depositors' account numbers. For a research trip to Europe before the 
merger, I had given my trip sponsors my old account number. When after several months my sizeable 
expected reimbursement did not materialize, I queried my sponsors and found that the remittance had F. M. Scherer, A perplexed economist confronts 'too big to fail' 
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explanation is consistent with results obtained by Amel and Liang (1997) for a non-
merger context. They found that high profits attracted new entrants, and (especially in 
rural banking markets) entry in turn reduced profits, though with a substantial time lag. 
Their inference is that a competitive process is at work in banking markets and that, if 
the  high  profits  reflected  only  firm-specific  efficiencies,  one  would  not  see  entry 
responding to the profit signal. 
5. Conclusion 
This compressed review of the literature on structure - performance relationships 
in banking reveals that structure clearly does matter. In particular, higher levels of local 
market bank concentration lead to lower interest rates for depositors and, with some 
complex exceptions, higher interest rates for borrowers. There are definite economies of 
scale and scope in banking, but on most dimensions they are exhausted at relatively low 
thresholds, below the size of at least the 50 largest U.S. banking institutions. Indeed, the 
maximum threshold reported in all but the most recent surveyed literature -- roughly $1 
billion of assets, which might translate to $2 billion at today's inflated asset values -- is 
surprisingly low. It is possible that scale economy thresholds in investment banking are 
higher than in commercial banking -- the focus of most published studies. But on this 
point, our ignorance is considerable. Capital-raising cost advantages probably persist out 
to larger scales, although it remains unclear whether investors and depositors might 
avoid receiving lower interest rates without incurring much more risk by investing in 
diversified portfolios of smaller banking entities. To the extent that the received wisdom 
on scale economies carries over, it would appear that well-executed divestitures among 
the  largest  banking  institutions  would  cause  little  in  the  way  of  lost  economic 
efficiencies. 
For one who has taught antitrust economics on and off for nearly half a century, 
divestiture  is  not  an  unfamiliar  specter.  But  it  is  also  one  that  is  not  implemented 
casually. As the U.S. Supreme Court observed in a 1951 antitrust decision, "[D]ivestiture 
is a remedy ... not to be used indiscriminately, without regard to the type of violation or 
whether other effective methods, less harsh, are available.."
34 Here a tradeoff must be 
recognized. When there is a serious failure of competition, at least in antitrust matters, it 
can  be  attacked  through  conduct  remedies  or  through  structural  remedies.  Conduct 
remedies  have  their  own  limitations.  If  they  are  imposed,  compliance  must  be 
monitored -- something, we recognized vividly when I was on the staff of the Federal 
Trade  Commission,  at  which  Washington  bureaucrats  are  not  very  adept.  Similar 
problems  carry  into  the  monitoring  of  financial  institution  conduct,  as  the  massive 
regulatory  failures  that  led  to  the  crisis  of  2008  revealed.  The  difference  between 
structural  remedies  --  i.e.,  divestiture  --  and  conduct  remedies  is  analogous  to  the 
difference in medicine between surgery and continuing drug therapy. With surgery, one 
hopes, the intervention is painful but brief, after which the patient lives happily ever 
                                                                                                                                        
been refused. I then called Customer Service at the acquiring bank, complaining that the new enterprise 
surely knew that the account numbers had been changed and could have figured out what to do with 
the remittance. I was told, "We don't anticipate needs for customer service." 
34 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. U.S., 341 U.S. 593, 603 (1951). See also U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery 
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 348 (1953).  
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after. Drug therapy is less dramatic, but must be monitored and adjusted continually. If 
the government is unable effectively to monitor the conduct of financial enterprises, and 
if, as even Alan Greenspan admitted after the crisis of 2008, market forces cannot be 
counted upon to do the job, divestiture may be a last but necessary resort. Since high 
financial  institution  concentration  resulted  from  mergers  joining  what  were  once 
separate but mostly viable entities, reversing it may not be as painful as skeptics might 
urge. And as the studies of commercial banking scale economies suggest, the efficiency 
losses need not be formidable. Nevertheless, the divestiture alternative was set aside 
early in the negotiations that led eventually to the so-called Dodd-Frank law passed in 
2010,  introducing  new  regulatory  frameworks  and  rules  within  which  U.S.  financial 
institutions must operate. F. M. Scherer, A perplexed economist confronts 'too big to fail' 
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